Feb 4, A Russian general is working on digital battle plans; hackers are attacking Germany's federal government; and a man in the Crimea wants to. Okt. Werfen Sie einen Blick auf Statistiken zu den vergangenen, laufenden und zukünftigen Spielen und erhalten Sie Informationen in Echtzeit zu. Okt. Mittwoch Oktober h. B. Paire - E. Gerasimov. B. Paire. Frankreich. Benoît Paire. 0. 0. Belarus. Egor Gerasimov. E. Gerasimov.
Moreover, the complex and multifarious tasks of peacekeeping which, possibly, regular troops will have to carry out, presume the creation of a fundamentally new system for preparing them.
After all, the task of a peacekeeping force is to disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population, cooperate in reducing potential violence and reestablish peaceful life.
All this demands academic preparation. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense.
Before , when the army at war time numbered more than 4. But conditions have changed. Now, countering diversionary-reconnaissance and terroristic forces can only be organized by the complex involvement of all the security and law-enforcement forces of the country.
The General Staff has begun this work. We need well-grounded recommendations on the use of interagency forces and means for the fulfillment of territorial defense, methods for combatting the terrorist and diversionary forces of the enemy under modern conditions.
Again, here defence also offence, as the two are sides of the same coin. But primarily I read into this a recognition of the importance for the close coordination of military, intelligence and information operations in this new way of war.
If we take Ukraine as the example, the GRU military intelligence took point over Crimea, supported by regular military units. The essence of this non-linear war is, as Gerasimov says, that the war is everywhere.
The experience of conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the necessity of working out — together with the research bodies of other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation — the role and extent of participation of the armed forces in postconflict regulation, working out the priority of tasks, the methods for activation of forces, and establishing the limits of the use of armed force.
The state of Russian military science today cannot be compared with the flowering of military-theoretical thought in our country on the eve of World War II.
Of course, there are objective and subjective reasons for this and it is not possible to blame anyone in particular for it.
I am not the one who said it is not possible to generate ideas on command. I agree with that, but I also must acknowledge something else: There were extraordinary personalities with brilliant ideas.
I would call them fanatics in the best sense of the word. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in but rather, unnoticed, proceeds long before that.
Our country paid in great quantities of blood for not listening to the conclusions of this professor of the General Staff Academy. What can we conclude from this?
A scornful attitude toward new ideas, to nonstandard approaches, to other points of view is unacceptable in military science. And it is even more unacceptable for practitioners to have this attitude toward science.
In conclusion, I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found.
He will always have vulnerabilities and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist. The answer is not to not have conflicts, but rather to ensure they are fought in the ways that best suit your needs.
We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves.
This is where military science takes on a crucial role. The outstanding Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin wrote: For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct.
Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template. This approach continues to be correct.
Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. That is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict.
Any academic pronouncements in military science are worthless if military theory is not backed by the function of prediction.
Their book, Unrestricted Warfare, argued a that there were now a variety of forms of warfare: The key distinction is that in the U.
As always, there is so much for so many people in this latest Mark Galeotti blog. For liberal democratic institutions operating under the rule of law, that requires great care.
Thank you for your insightful posting as always. You also might want to look at my chapter here, published in December A Rude Awakening, Stockholm: There you will also find a figure that Gerasimov used to illustrate his article.
No one stands [behind him]. No one gives [him] orders. There is no one else. His superiors are of a different kind. He considers himself conscripted, mobilized by a substance the existence of which is almost universally doubted.
Reblogged this on Andreas Umland. You find it behind following links:. How about the idea that the Gerasimov Doctrine is in part a reaction to the ineffectiveness of Russian conventional military tactics?
When I look at the activities of Russian troops [ahem: Implying that they do not have all-weather bombing capabilities.
And we see Russian video footage in Syria of dumb bombs missing their intended targets by metres or more. With a military of 4.
Russian regulars ripped through their Ukrainian counterparts, and to be honest they are more interested in utility than functionality.
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His books include Spetsnaz: He is a columnist for Raam op Rusland and the Moscow Times. Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.
Speaking on Russian espionage on Bloomberg TV, A friendlier Russia in ? A one-minute "geopolitical surprise" prediction for Wikistrat.
Crime, Crimea and the Kremlin: Posted in Military - Russia , Security , Ukraine. Posted by Mark Galeotti on July 6, https: Dear Professor Mark Galeotti, Thank you for your insightful posting as always.
Oh well, am looking forward to the publication of your book on the Chechen war. Mark Galeotti, your excellent essay inspired me to translate it into german.
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Critical Studies on Security: Head of the General Staff replaced". Retrieved 11 November Retrieved July 25, Retrieved from " https: Archived copy as title CS1 uses Russian-language script ru CS1 Russian-language sources ru Articles containing Russian-language text Interlanguage link template existing link Commons category link is on Wikidata.
General of the Army .His books include Spetsnaz: But conditions have changed. Some say this is simply a new and well-articulated version of what Russians have always done, or that Putin is slot casino free coins as an all-powerful boogeyman, or that competition among the various oligarchic factions handball deutschland schweden the Kremlin means there is no canyon gebraucht strategic purpose to their activities. As always, there is so much for so many people in this latest Mark Galeotti blog. This page was last edited on 15 Octobergerasimov In other words, this is gerasimov explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends—the actual forces used are irrelevant—but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. This requires leadership and clarity about the threat—which we saw briefly in France, gerasimov the government rallied to warn voters about Russian info ops in advance of the presidential election. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Neue online casinos februar 2019 was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November Game art maybe the opposite is true — that precisely these events are typical of australia no deposit mobile casino in the 21st century. That meeting will possibly result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey. The Russian security state defines America as the primary adversary. During the protests there, the Kremlin supported extremists on both sides of the fight—pro-Russian forces and Ukrainian ultra-nationalists—fueling conflict that the Kremlin used as a pretext to seize Crimea and launch the war in eastern Ukraine.